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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
CRIMINAL LAw-REPROSECUTION FOR HIGHER DEGREE OF CRIME
HELD DOUBLE JEOPARDY.-Upon an indictment for first degree
murder in New York, the defendant was convicted of murder in
the second degree. On appeal, this conviction was reversed and
a new trial granted. At the second trial, upon the same indictment,
the defendant was convicted of first degree murder. On appeal,
this conviction was also reversed and a new trial again granted.
At the third trial, upon the same indictment, the defendant was
found guilty of murder in the second degree. In reversing the
district court's denial of an application for a writ of habeas corpus,
the United States Court of Appeals held that a prosecution for
first degree murder after reversal of a conviction of second degree
murder was a denial of due process, since there was a reasonable
possibility of prejudice, and since the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment places sone limitations upon the state's right
to reprosecute. United States v. Wilkins, 348 F.2d 844 (2d Cir.
1965).
At common law, the principle developed that "no man is to be
brought into jeopardy of his life, more than once, for the same
offence."" However, the protection given by this doctrine was
restricted, generally, to Crown prosecutions for capital felonies, and
jeopardy did not attach until final judgment.2
Although the English requirement of a prior final judgment
remained unchanged ' in the United States prior to 1789, the fifth
amendment to the Constitution extended the double jeopardy pro-
tection beyond capital felonies.4  This expanded protection repre-
sented two distinct policies: that no person should be punished
more than once for the same offense; that no individual should
be harassed by successive prosecutions for a single wrongful act
or activity.5
In interpreting the Constitution, the federal courts have formu-
lated certain definite standards relating to double jeopardy. For
example, jeopardy attaches when a jury has been impaneled and
sworn, or when the court in a nonjury trial has begun to hear
evidence. 7  Reprosecution is permitted, however, in various in-
stances even where a former trial terminated after the jury was
sworn or evidence taken. For example, reprosecution is permissible
14 BLA csToNE, COMMENTAREs *335.
2 See id. at *335-36.
8 See Sigler, A History of Double Jeopardy, 7 Am. J. LEGAL HisT. 283,
300 (1963).
4 "[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
5Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 169, 173 (1873).6 Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963); Cornero v. United
States, 48 F.2d 69 (9th Cir. 1931).
7 E.g., McCarthy v. Zerbst, 85 F.2d 640 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S.
610 (1936).
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in the event of : inability of the jury to agree; 8 disqualification of a
juror; 9 outside influence brought to bear on a jury; 10 death or
other incapacity of the trial judge; 11 the tactical needs of the
military in time of war.12 Thus, so long as the trial is terminated
because of a relatively objective "breakdown in judicial ma-
chinery," 13 rather than because of improper conduct or error on
the part of the prosecutor or judge, the federal courts have had
little difficulty in finding that a reprosecution of the accused does
not -violate the mandate against double jeopardy contained in the
fifth amendment.' 4
The accused may also be reprosecuted in the federal courts for
the same crime after he has successfully appealed his conviction
of that crime.'5 The courts have generally made use of the waiver
theory' 6 in explaining why such a reprosecution is permissible.
Justification for such a reprosecution may be found in Justice Holmes'
theory of continuing jeopardy propounded in his dissenting opinion
in Kepner v. United States: "a man cannot be said to be more
than once in jeopardy in the same cause, however often he may be
tried. The jeopardy is one continuous jeopardy from its beginning
to the end of the cause." 17 Underlying this theory is the idea that
when a defendant successfully appeals a conviction, the appellate
court is saying, in effect, that there was no trial, and the defendant,
thus, was never in jeopardy. Under this theory, jeopardy does not
attach until after a final judgment has been rendered.
The question with which we are concerned is this: when the
defendant is charged with an offense, is convicted of a lesser included
offense, appeals from the conviction and is awarded a new trial,
can he thereafter be tried for the greater offense? In Trono v.
8 United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580 (1824).
9 E.g., Thompson v. United States, 155 U.S. 271 (1894).
10 Simmons v. United States, 142 U.S. 148 (1891).
I People ex rel. Brinkman v. Barr, 248 N.Y. 126, 161 N.E. 444 (1928);
People v. Valenti, 49 Cal. Rep. 2d 199, 316 P.2d 633 (1957).
12 Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 688-89 (1949).
13 Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364, 372 (1961) (dissenting opinion).14 Cornero v. United States, supra note 6; State ex rel. Manning v. Himes,
153 Fla. 711, 15 So. 2d 613 (1943).
15 Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15 (1919); United States v. Ball,
163 U.S. 662 (1896).
10 There are two aspects to the waiver theory. Most courts hold that by
appealing a conviction the defendant "waives" his right to the protection
against being put twice in jeopardy in regard to the offense of which he was
convicted. However, other courts have held that the reversal of the judgment
of conviction opens up the whole controversy and acts upon the originaljudgment as if it had never existed. In other words, by successfully
appealing, the defendant "waives" the protection of double jeopardy in regard
to anything that occurred at the prior trial. Trono v. United States, 199
U.S. 521 (1905).
17 195 U.S. 100, 134 (1904) (dissenting opinion).
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United States,18 a case originating in the local courts of the Philippine
Islands, the defendants were indicted for murder but were -con-
victed of assault. They appealed to the Philippine Supreme Court,
which, in accordance with local, practice, entered a conviction of
murder without remanding the case for retrial. The United States
Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the defendants, by appealing,
waived their immunity from double jeopardy. The Court reasoned
that if the defendants sought a complete acquittal, they assumed the
risk of being found guilty of the greater offense originally charged.
However, in Green v. United States,9 the Court distinguished
Trono on the ground that the latter involved only a statutory pro-
hibition against double jeopardy. Green held that where the de-
fendant was indicted for first degree murder but was convicted
of second degree murder and arson, and successfully appealed, it
was a violation of the double jeopardy provision of the fifth amend-
ment to retry him for first degree murder. The Court held thai
by -taking a successful appeal from his improper conviction of
second degree murder, the defendant did not waive his constitutional
defense of former jeopardy to a second prosecution on the first
degree murder indictment.
Thus, Green rejects the reasoning of Trono when dealing with
a prosecution under the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amend-
ment, and establishes that when a defendant is convicted in a
federal court of a lesser included offense, and successfully appeals
his conviction of the lesser crime, an offense greater than that of
which he was convicted cannot be considered at any new trial.
The difficult question is whether this limitation on reprosecution
is applicable to the states.
While the states are not bound by the requirements of the first
eight amendments to the Constitution, except as those prohibitions
are held applicable through the fourteenth amendment,20 prohibitions
against a second trial for the same offense after a defendant has
been acquitted are found in the constitutions of all but five states.21
In those five, the common-law prohibition against a retrial on a
similar indictment after acquittal is recognized. 22
The Supreme Court, in Palko v. Connecticut 23 held that certain
provisions of the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment are
not applicable to the states through the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. In that case, the defendant was indicted
for first degree murder, but was convicted of second degree murder.
Ls 199 U.S. 521 (1905).
29 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
20 Ohio ex rel. Lloyd v. Dollison, 194 U.S. 445 (1904).
21 Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, North Carolina and Vermont.22 E.g., Commonwealth v. Hart, 149 Mass. 7, 20 N.E. 310 (1889).
23302 U.S. 319 (1937).
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Under a Connecticut statute,2 4 the state appealed, and won a re-
versal on the ground that it was prejudiced in attempting to convict
the defendant of the higher degree of the crime. At the new trial,
the defendant was convicted of first degree murder. Mr. justice
Cardozo, speaking for the Court, stated that only those rights
which "have been found to be implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty" are absorbed by the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment and made applicable to the states.25 While it is a
violation of double jeopardy in the federal courts for the Government
to appeal an acquittal, 26 the United States Supreme Court held
that this type of double jeopardy did not exceed the limits imposed
upon the states by the due process clause.
Is that kind of double jeopardy to which the statute has subjected him
[the accused] a hardship so acute and shocking that our polity will not endure
it? Does it violate those 'fundamental principles of liberty and justice which
lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions'? .... The answer
surely must be 'no.' 27
Thus, Palko stands for the proposition that the states are
not bound by all of the federal prohibitions in regard to double
jeopardy-but the Court indicated that due process, as applied to
the states, encompasses certain of the double jeopardy provisions of
the fifth amendment.2
Prior to the disposition of the instant case it had been held
in New York that it was not double jeopardy to reprosecute a
defendant for first degree murder after he successfully appealed his
conviction of second degree murder.29 In addition, the law in New
York is firmly established that when a defendant procures a
reversal of a conviction he may again be tried on the original in-
dictment. ° The decisions in this area are buttressed by two pro-
visions of the New York Code of Criminal Procedure which
provide that "the granting of a new trial places the parties in the
24 CoNw. Gm. STAT. REv. § 6494 (1930), now contained in CoNN. Gzx.
STAT. Arm. § 54-96 (1960).
25 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
20 Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904).
27 Supra note 25, at 328.
28 Ibid. For example, "if the state were permitted after a trial free
from error to try the accused over again or to bring another case against
him," or if the state was "attempting to wear the accused out by a
multitude of cases with accumulated trials," such actions would be found
unconstitutional. Ibid.
29 People ex rel. Hetenyi v. Johnston, 10 App. Div. 2d 121, 198 N.Y.S.2d
18 (3d Dep't), appeal dismissed, 8 N.Y.2d 913, 168 N.E.2d 830, 204 N.Y.S.2d
158 (1960).
0 People v. Ercole, 4 N.Y.2d 617, 152 N.E.2d 77, 176 N.Y.S.2d 649
(1958); People v. McGrath, 202 N.Y. 445, 96 N.E. 92 (1911); People v.
Palmer, 109 N.Y. 413, 17 N.E. 213 (1888).
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same position as if no trial had been had," 31 and that "when a
new trial is ordered, it shall proceed in all respects as if no trial
had been had." 32 Thus, the rule in New York is at variance with
the federal rule, as enunciated in Green.
Judge Marshall, speaking for the Court in Wilkins, resolved
this conflict by declaring the New York rule unconstitutional to the
extent that it permitted reprosecution for the greater offense. He
determined that the fourteenth amendment imposes some limitations
on a state's power to reprosecute an individual for the same crime,
and pointed out that in Green the United States Supreme Court
held that this type of reprosecution was double jeopardy under the
fifth amendment 33  Thus, Judge Marshall concluded that it
was also double jeopardy under the fourteenth amendment, "for
Green involved more than a 'subtle technical controversy' and the
decision rested on that aspect of the Fifth Amendment double
jeopardy provision that must be ranked as fundamental." H4 e in-
dicated that Palka does not stand for the proposition that due process
includes no part of the protection against double jeopardy; rather,
it merely stands for the proposition that the particular type of
double jeopardy found there is not applicable to the states, since
it is not necessary to the concept of ordered liberty and fundamental
fairness. To permit the state to reprosecute the accused for the
greater charge in Palko "was to provide the state with an op-
portunity 'to do better a second time' only because it had been
prejudiced by substantial legal error the first time. . . . This
could hardly be classified as fundamentally unfair." 35
In contrast, it was the defendant who appealed in the instant
case. The success of this appeal meant that he was prejudiced
by substantial legal error, and there is no basis for supposing that
these errors impaired the substantial rights of the prosecution and
contributed to its failure to obtain a conviction on the first degree
murder charge. If anything was to be inferred, it was that the
state was aided in obtaining a conviction for murder in the second
degree by the errors at the trial. To permit the state to reprosecute
for the greater charge here would be to provide it with an op-
portunity "to do better a second time," not because it had been
prejudiced by substantial legal error the first time, but because the
accused had been so prejudiced, and because this prejudice to his
cause had been perceived on appeal.3 6  The Wilkins Court held
that forcing the accused to waive the protection of double jeopardy
as regards the greater offense is patently unjust, since a severe
3
'N.Y. CoD. CRIm. PRoc. § 464.
32N.Y. CODE CRM. PRoc. § 544.
3 Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
34 United States v. Wilkins, 348 F.2d 844, 856 (2d Cir. 1965).35 Id. at 860.
86 Ibid.
[ VOL.. 40
RECENT DECISIONS
limitation is placed upon the right of a defendant to appeal his
conviction.37
The first effect of this case is, therefore, to declare that the
previous interpretation of Sections 464 and 544 of the New York
Code of Criminal Procedure is inconsistent with the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. The application of the
holding, however, is not necessarily limited to New York. By
declaring that this type of reprosecution is forbidden by the fourteenth
amendment, the Court is applying those standards which it feels
the United States Supreme Court would apply.
In determining which rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights
are made applicable to the states through the due process clause,
the Supreme Court has been using, basically, the test formulated
in Palko-they are those fundamental rights essential to ordered
liberty.
The Supreme Court has not, as yet, held the protection against
double jeopardy to be a fundamental right. However, as Mr.
Justice Cardozo pointed out in Palko, while the particular type of
reprosecution involved there was not fundamentally unfair, there
were instances in which reprosecution would "violate those 'funda-
mental principles of all our civil and political institutions.' "38 The
result would be different, indeed, if the statutory scheme permitted
a new trial after a verdict free from error, or if the defendant
could be harassed by a "multitude of cases." 39
An affirmance of the instant case may be predicated upon a
finding by the United States Supreme Court that reprosecution
under these circumstances is fundamentally unfair, either because
it limits a defendant's right to appeal or because the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment includes the protection against
double jeopardy. The recent trend of the Court has been to
incorporate into the fourteenth amendment many of the rights
contained in the first eight amendments. 40 Thus, it is likely that
it will also incorporate the protection against double jeopardy.
However, it is not likely that the Court will incorporate the double
jeopardy provision in its entirety, since to do so would require
7 Id. at 859.
38 Supra note 25, at 328, citing Herbert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316
(1926).30 Supra note 25, at 328.
40 See, e.g., Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (protection against
self-incrimination forbids both comment by prosecutor on accused's silence
and instructions by the court that such silence is evidence of guilt) ; Pointer
v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (right of confrontation guaranteed by the
sixth amendment); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (prohibition against
self-incrimination contained in the fifth amendment) ; Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 333 (1963) (right to counsel contained in the sixth amendment);
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (prohibition against unreasonable search
and seizure contained in the fourth amendment).
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overruling the Palko determination that only a part of the double
jeopardy provision-that which is fundamental-is applicable to the
states. Since the states do not now enjoy carte blanche with
respect to reprosecution for the offense originally charged, it
seems likely that the Supreme Court will only extend the pro-
hibition to include reprosecution for a higher offense, where the
defendant has been convicted of, and successfully appeals the lesser
offense included in the indictment.
X
TORTS-DRAM SHoP ACT-STATUTORY COVERAGE DoEs NOT
PRECLUDE CommoN-LAW NEGLIGENCE ACTioN.-Plaintiffs brought
an action against a tavern owner for wrongful death and personal
injuries on the ground that he had negligently served liquor to two
intoxicated men who thereafter caused an automobile collision
resulting in the alleged injuries and deaths. In denying defend-
ants motion to dismiss the negligence cause of action, the New
York Supreme Court held that an action under the Dram Shop
Act was not the exclusive remedy-that recovery for common-law
negligence was also available. Berkeley v. Park, 47 Misc. 2d 381,
262 N.Y.S.2d 290 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
At common law, the sale of liquor to an intoxicated person
was not considered the proximate cause of any injury inflicted
by the purchaser.1 Thus, while the intoxicated person remained
liable for any injury he caused to others, the act of the vendor in
selling liquor to him was not actionable by the injured third
party,2 unless the injury took place on the vendor's premises.3
When such liability attached, the seller's act was considered a willful
breach of his duty to use reasonable care in policing the premises,
which breach was the proximate cause of the injury.4
To afford a remedy against vendors for the acts of intoxicated
persons to whom they had served liquor, about one-half of the
states, including New York, passed so-called Civil Damage Acts,
better known as Dram Shop Acts.5  These statutes arose out of
the temperance movement of the 1870's. The purpose of these
laws was to suppress the sale of intoxicating liquor by making
persons who sold it liable for damages which resulted from the
ensuing intoxication.6 A plaintiff, thereunder, was not required
I Belding v. Johnson, 86 Ga. 177, 12 S.E. 304 (1890).
2 Seibel v. Leach, 233 Wis. 66, 288 N.W. 774 (1939).
3 Tyrrell v. Quigley, 186 Misc. 972, 60 N.Y.S.2d 821 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
4 bid.
50gilvie, History and Appraisal of the Illinois Dram Shop Act, 1958
U. ILL. L.F. 175, 180 n. 30.
6 Mead v. Stratton, 87 N.Y. 493 (1882).
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